



SALVATION WITHOUT RESURRECTION? A SOTERIOLOGICAL-ESCHATOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF TRANSHUMANISM, MIND UPLOADING, AND THE PROMISE OF DIGITAL IMMORTALITY

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Abstract

Transhumanism increasingly relocates the human longing for salvation from the religious sphere into technological projects. Among its most radical proposals is mind uploading: the claim that human mental structures, memories, personality, or consciousness could be transferred to, or reconstructed on, a non-biological substrate, allowing some form of existence to continue beyond biological death. This article subjects the promise of digital immortality to a Christian soteriological-eschatological critique. Using a constructive-systematic theological approach, it combines literature review, conceptual analysis, and critical engagement with recent scholarship on transhumanism, personal identity, artificial intelligence, and Christian eschatology. It argues that mind uploading cannot be identified with salvation or resurrection because informational persistence is not the same as personal continuity, disembodiment is incompatible with a resurrection-centered anthropology, and Christian salvation is not achieved through technological preservation but through God's action in Christ. The article's contribution lies in formulating "resurrective-continuity criteria" comprising four interrelated elements: divine agency, embodied personal continuity, Christological participation, and cosmic renewal. These criteria show that technology may extend, represent, or simulate life, but it cannot produce the eschatological mode of life that Christian faith names resurrection. The decisive problem raised by transhumanism, therefore, is not merely the limit of technological capability. It is the redefinition of salvation itself: from gift to engineering, from resurrection to informational replication, and from new creation to the persistence of a system.

Keywords: transhumanism; mind uploading; salvation; resurrection; eschatology; digital immortality

INTRODUCTION

The desire to transcend death is hardly new, but digital technologies have given that desire a form without historical precedent. Regenerative medicine, genetic engineering, artificial intelligence, brain-computer interfaces, cryopreservation, and personality simulation increasingly

recast death from an existential boundary into a problem imagined as technically tractable. Within transhumanism, biological limitation is no longer accepted as a fixed condition of human existence but treated as a temporary constraint that technology may, in principle, correct. Nick Bostrom places life

extension, cognitive enhancement, and the transformation of human beings toward posthuman conditions within the normative horizon of transhumanism (Bostrom, 2005, pp. 3-14). Ray Kurzweil later popularized the vision that exponential advances in computation would progressively erode the boundary between the biological and the digital, allowing human life to be sustained through systems that far exceed the capacities of the organic body (Kurzweil, 2005, pp. 198-210).

One of the most radical expressions of this vision is *mind uploading*. The proposal rests on the assumption that human mental processes can be mapped, reproduced, and instantiated on a non-biological substrate. If neural configurations, memories, preferences, response patterns, and structures of consciousness could be reconstructed with sufficient precision, a digital system is said to be capable of preserving a person's identity after the biological body ceases to function. In recent scholarship, *mind uploading* is no longer treated merely as science fiction but as a serious problem in philosophy of mind, ethics, anthropology, and theology. Roland Chia interprets the project as a quest for "immortality" that forces Christian theology to reconsider the relation among body, mind, personal identity, and resurrection (Chia, 2023, pp. 1036-1088). Bojan Žalec further argues that the plausibility of *mind uploading* remains deeply

problematic because human consciousness appears to depend on biological, phenomenological, relational, and lived bodily dimensions, not merely on information that can be copied (Žalec, 2025).

Recent developments have also shifted the debate from the question "Is uploading possible?" to the more fundamental question, "What kind of existence would uploading produce if it became possible?" Kaunda and Lee argue that *mind uploading* creates a liminal zone between life, death, and life after life, thereby reconfiguring how mortality itself is understood (Kaunda & Lee, 2025). Menacho and Puig-Puig interpret technological optimism as a salvation narrative with its own soteriological structure: a diagnosis of the human problem, a technological mediator, a process of transformation, and the promise of a superior final condition (Menacho & Puig-Puig, 2025, pp. 677-699). Baggot describes transhumanism as possessing a "secular eschatology" because it promises liberation from illness, weakness, aging, and death without requiring divine action (Baggot, 2024, pp. 841-878). The debate over transhumanism, therefore, can no longer be contained within the ethics of technology. The deeper issue is whether technology is assuming the conceptual role traditionally occupied by doctrines of salvation and eschatological hope.

Within Indonesian theology, discussion of artificial intelligence

and digital transformation has likewise intensified. Pantan assesses the presence of ChatGPT and AI ambivalently: these technologies can widen access to information, yet they can also diminish human formation if Christian education is reduced to the transmission of knowledge (Pantan, 2023, pp. 111-124). Limbong argues that the church may use AI strategically, while insisting that ecclesial identity, relational presence, and sacramental practice cannot be reduced to algorithmic functions (Limbong, 2025, pp. 194-211). From an eschatological perspective, Kayadoe reads the new heaven and new earth as a vision of renewal with ethical consequences for present life, rather than as an escape from the world (Kayadoe, 2023, pp. 78-93). Taken together, these trajectories show that technology, embodiment, community, and ultimate hope cannot be separated in contemporary theological reflection.

A significant gap nevertheless remains. Some studies approach transhumanism through Christian anthropology; others address the digital church or the ethics of AI; studies of *mind uploading*, meanwhile, often concentrate on personal identity and technological feasibility. Suwanto, for example, identifies a tension between AI transhumanism and the doctrine of union with Christ, arguing that Christian transformation cannot be replaced by technological enhancement (Suwanto, 2025, pp. 1-

34). Pardede and Marpaung adopt a more open position, proposing that post-biological entities may be understood as forms of “I and not-I” that retain traces of the *imago Dei* through continuities of relation, memory, and self-expression (Pardede & Marpaung, 2026, pp. 1-19). Their proposal is important and provocative, but it presses a further question: are continuities of pattern, memory, and relation sufficient to establish that a digitally instantiated subject is numerically the same person who died biologically? More pointedly, can such persistence rightly be called salvation?

This article argues that these questions must be answered from the center of Christian soteriology: the death and resurrection of Christ. Christianity does not promise immortality by circumventing death, duplicating information, or escaping embodiment. It promises the resurrection of the dead and the renewal of creation. The discussion of transhumanism must therefore move beyond anthropological critique toward a more explicitly soteriological-eschatological one. The article's principal contribution is the formulation of “resurrective-continuity criteria” as a theological instrument for distinguishing digital persistence from Christian salvation. The criteria comprise four inseparable elements: divine agency, embodied personal continuity, Christological participation, and cosmic renewal. On this basis, the decisive question is not whether

human beings may one day construct a digital replica that resembles a person with extraordinary fidelity. The question is whether that replica is genuinely the same person and whether its mode of persistence possesses the structure that Christian theology can call resurrection.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study employs a qualitative method within a constructive-systematic theological framework. Such an approach is necessary because transhumanism cannot be assessed adequately through description of technological phenomena or exegesis of a single biblical text. It requires a critical correlation of anthropology, soteriology, Christology, and eschatology. The research data consist of academic literature on transhumanism, mind uploading, personal identity, artificial intelligence, embodiment, resurrection, and salvation. Priority is given to publications from 2023-2026 in order to engage the most recent developments, while foundational works in transhumanist discourse and resurrection theology remain part of the analytical framework.

The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, it maps the soteriological structure of transhumanism, particularly the way technology is positioned as a means of liberation from biological limitation and death. Second, it tests the assumptions behind mind

uploading through the problems of personal identity and embodiment, with particular attention to the distinction between informational reproduction and continuity of the subject. Third, it reconstructs a Christian response from New Testament testimony concerning resurrection, especially 1 Corinthians 15, Romans 8:11-25, Philippians 3:20-21, and the horizon of new creation in Revelation 21:1-5. The third stage yields the “resurrective-continuity criteria” used to evaluate claims of digital immortality. The method is therefore not anti-technological. It distinguishes judgments about the instrumental value of technology from the metaphysical and soteriological claims attached to it.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Transhumanism as Technological Soteriology

Transhumanism is often introduced as a philosophical movement that supports the enhancement of the human condition through science and technology. That description is accurate but insufficient. Behind the program of enhancement lies a particular diagnosis of the human problem. The body is treated as fragile, aging as a defect to be overcome, cognitive limitation as an obstacle, and death as a technical problem that may eventually be defeated. Transhumanism thus carries both an anthropology of the human as unfinished and a soteriology of the human as

improvable. Menacho and Puig-Puig show that confidence in technology takes on the structure of a salvation narrative when technology is no longer used merely to heal but is charged with delivering humanity into a final condition free from fundamental limitations (Menacho & Puig-Puig, 2025, pp. 680-686).

This structure becomes especially clear in *mind uploading*. At a minimal level, digital technologies can preserve traces of a person in the form of voice, images, text, preferences, and patterns of communication. At a more advanced level, AI systems can be trained to imitate a person's conversational style so that family members may interact with a digital representation after biological death. However, the transhumanist vision goes further. What is sought is not merely a digital memorial but the continuation of the "self" in another medium. Chia explains that this vision depends on the assumption that human identity can be preserved if the relevant mental information is transferred with sufficient fidelity (Chia 2023, 1048-1065). At this point a decisive anthropological shift occurs: the human person is understood primarily as an informational pattern, while the body becomes replaceable hardware.

The attraction of this shift is obvious because it appears to offer salvation without waiting for resurrection. If the body can be left behind while mental patterns continue to run, biological death

need no longer be final. However, this is precisely where transhumanist soteriology diverges fundamentally from the gospel. In Christianity, salvation is not synonymous with prolonging biological function or preserving memory. It concerns reconciliation with God, forgiveness of sin, the renewal of the human person, victory over death, and the restoration of creation. Death is not understood merely as a failure of biological hardware but as an enemy bound up with the fallen condition of creation and the power of sin. A technical solution to death, therefore, does not by itself address the human soteriological problem.

Suwanto rightly distinguishes technological transcendence from transformation in Christ. Transhumanism seeks enhanced capacity, whereas Christian salvation is grounded in union with the crucified and risen Christ (Suwanto, 2025, pp. 19-27). The difference lies not merely in the means employed but in the agent and *telos* of salvation. In transhumanism, humanity becomes the architect of its own final condition. In the gospel, life is received as a gift that cannot be manufactured. Sherbert names the corresponding danger *techno-idolatry*: technology ceases to be understood as an instrument within creation. It becomes an ultimate horizon that assumes a religious function by determining what humanity should finally hope for (Sherbert, 2025). This criticism must not collapse into the demonization of

technology. Medical and digital technologies demonstrably sustain and improve life. The problem begins when instrumental success is converted into the claim that technology can redeem existence itself.

The distinction between therapy and soteriology must therefore be maintained. Restoring bodily function, extending healthy life, developing prosthetics, using AI for diagnosis, or even replacing damaged organs does not in itself contradict Christian faith. Such practices may be understood as forms of human participation in the care and preservation of life. Jenkins likewise argues that Christian assessment of transhumanism must be more discriminating than wholesale rejection, because certain forms of enhancement may be directed toward the common good and human dignity (Jenkins, 2025). Acceptance of technology, however, does not entail acceptance of transhumanist metaphysics. Theology can say “yes” to healing without saying “yes” to the definition of the human person as information; it can affirm life extension without calling it immortality; and it can welcome innovation without turning innovation into a substitute for resurrection.

At this point, contributions from Diegesis on AI become particularly relevant. Pantan warns that AI may expand knowledge and increase efficiency, but it must not

reduce human formation to the mere acquisition of information (Pantan, 2023, pp. 118-123). Limbong similarly resists reducing the church to digital functions because relational presence and the embodied life of the community carry theological significance that cannot be exchanged for virtual representation (Limbong, 2025, pp. 206-211). The same principle applies even more forcefully to *mind uploading*. If digital representation is not identical with human relational presence in the church, then even an extraordinarily sophisticated mental representation cannot automatically be identified with the person it represents. Functional resemblance is insufficient to establish ontological identity.

Transhumanism should therefore be read as a soteriological rival, not because every technology associated with it is objectionable, but because it tends to relocate the center of hope. Christian hope, directed toward the God who raises the dead, is displaced by confidence in humanity's capacity to preserve its own patterns. At that point salvation changes from a relational event into a technical project, gift into achievement, and hope into prediction. That is where a soteriological critique must begin.

Mind Uploading and the Problem of Personal Identity

The claim that *mind uploading* can deliver immortality depends on one decisive assumption: the uploaded

result must be the same person, not merely an exceptionally accurate copy. If what emerges is only a duplicate, biological death still terminates the existence of the original subject. A digital avatar may know a person's biography, reproduce the person's voice, remember the names of family members, and respond in recognizably similar ways. None of these capacities, however, demonstrates that the first-person center of consciousness that experienced the world before death now continues within the digital system. Personal identity is therefore not a secondary philosophical detail. It is the critical point on which the claim of "digital immortality" as genuine survival stands or falls.

Some theories of personhood emphasize psychological continuity. If memory, dispositions, goals, and mental structures continue, personal identity is said to persist. This position gives *mind uploading* conceptual room to operate. However, the duplication problem arises immediately. If one brain can be scanned and produce two identical uploads, both cannot be numerically identical with the same biological person at the same time. Each may remember "I am the person who was scanned," but numerical identity cannot branch without contradiction. Chia uses a related problem to argue that copying information accounts more readily for replication than for the survival of a subject (Chia, 2023, pp.

1066-1075). Žalec likewise stresses the difficulty facing functionalist accounts because the human mind is not simply a collection of abstract functions; it is shaped by embodiment, first-person perspective, emotion, environment, and social relations (Žalec 2025).

This criticism becomes more forceful once the body is understood not as a temporary container for a "true self" but as a constitutive dimension of human personhood. Human beings remember through bodies, encounter the world through bodies, love through bodily presence, suffer in bodies, and acquire habits through embodied histories. Not every dimension of personhood can be converted into discrete data without losing the existential context from which it arose. The claim that a complete mapping of the brain could capture the "I" therefore tends to assume what it is supposed to prove: that subjectivity is identical with a transferable informational configuration.

In recent Indonesian discussion, Pardede and Marpaung offer a more open reading. They propose that a post-biological entity may display both continuity and discontinuity as an "I and not-I," while traces of the *imago Dei* may remain present through patterns of relation, memory, and self-expression that participate in human history (Pardede & Marpaung, 2026, pp. 8-15). The proposal is valuable because it refuses a simplistic opposition between an "authentic

human” and a “worthless copy.” A digital entity that preserves a person's memories may indeed possess relational, historical, or memorial value. It may become an extraordinarily complex personal artifact and, if genuinely conscious, might even warrant some form of moral status. From a soteriological standpoint, however, the question is stricter: is this entity the same subject who stood before God, sinned, received grace, died, and is raised?

This article therefore distinguishes three kinds of continuity. First, informational continuity concerns the persistence of data, patterns, memories, and behavioral traits. Second, relational continuity concerns the capacity of a representation to sustain certain connections with family, community, and personal history. Third, personal continuity concerns the persistence of the same subject through change. The first two may be technologically engineered. The third cannot simply be inferred from them. A person may possess an extraordinarily complete digital archive without that archive becoming the person. An AI model may speak “like” someone without becoming the subject who actually lived that person's childhood, suffering, repentance, faith, and death.

This distinction also helps theology avoid two opposite errors. The first is reductive materialism, which treats the human person as nothing more than a computational

pattern. The second is a crude dualism that renders the body theologically insignificant and thereby makes *mind uploading* appear compatible with Christian faith. Neither is adequate. New Testament resurrection does not teach that salvation consists in the soul's permanent escape from the body. Paul speaks of the resurrection and transformation of the body, not its abolition. The expression *sōma pneumatikon* in 1 Corinthians 15:44 does not mean an “immaterial body,” but a body governed and enlivened by the Spirit. Paul's contrast is between a body subject to mortality and a body animated by the Spirit, not between bad matter and good Spirit.

The implication is substantial. If Christian identity is irreducibly embodied, replacing the body with a digital substrate is not a neutral change of medium. It alters the anthropological structure of the subject. Technology may produce highly persuasive representations, but resurrection is grounded neither in the preservation of old biological matter nor in the reproduction of mental patterns. Resurrection is God's act of sustaining personal identity through radical transformation. The conceptual difficulty of *mind uploading* therefore opens onto a stronger category: resurrective continuity. This continuity is not a physical mechanism awaiting computational explanation. It is a theological claim that the God who creates and knows

persons is able to raise the same person into a transformed mode of life.

From the standpoint of resurrection theology, the question “How much data must be copied for a person to remain the same person?” is therefore misdirected. Eschatological identity does not depend on retaining a particular percentage of bodily matter, nor on the successful transfer of information. It depends on God's faithfulness to creation and to the persons God calls. Technology operates through causal continuity within systems. Resurrection occurs through God's creative and faithful action. These need not be staged as science against faith, because they answer different kinds of questions. The conflict arises only when a technological system is claimed to produce what theology means by resurrection.

Resurrection as the Form of Christian Salvation

The center of the Christian critique of digital immortality should not be fear of technology but the nature of resurrection. In 1 Corinthians 15, Paul argues that if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ has not been raised, proclamation is empty, faith is futile, and believers remain in their sins. Resurrection is therefore not an eschatological appendix that can be exchanged for a theory of soul-survival or technological persistence. It is constitutive of the gospel. Christian

salvation without resurrection is no longer Christian salvation in the form given by the gospel.

Paul's statement that the body is “sown perishable” and “raised imperishable” holds continuity and transformation together. What is raised is not a new subject who merely resembles the person who died, but the same person transformed. The analogy of the seed indicates that the final form cannot be reduced to the initial form, yet neither is it unrelated to the history from which it emerges. Resurrection therefore exceeds the two options that often dominate discussions of *mind uploading*: perfect preservation or perfect replication. It requires neither the retention of all biological matter nor the manufacture of a copy. It is new creation faithful to the identity of the creature who died.

A second dimension is divine agency. Romans 8:11 declares that the Spirit of the One who raised Jesus from the dead will give life to the mortal bodies of believers. God is the primary agent of resurrection. This distinguishes Christian salvation from the transhumanist project at the most basic level. Transhumanism constructs a path from humanity toward immortality through enhanced capacity. The gospel announces a movement from God toward humanity through the resurrection of Christ. The former is structured by *self-transcendence*; the latter by grace. Even if a technology could extend digital existence for an indefinitely long period, such

success would not thereby become salvation in the Christian sense. Indefinite duration is not eternal life, because eternal life in the New Testament is defined by relation to God and participation in the life of Christ.

A third dimension is Christological. Philippians 3:20-21 does not say that human beings will abandon their bodies for informational existence. Christ will “transform our lowly body” to be like his glorious body. The eschatological pattern of human existence is the risen Christ. In the testimony of the Gospels and Paul, Jesus' resurrection holds together continuity of identity, bodily reality, and transformation. He is recognizable, bears wounds, eats, speaks, and enters relationships, yet he exists in a mode of life no longer subject to death. The human future is therefore not defined by our capacity to engineer more durable versions of ourselves, but by conformity to the risen Christ.

Suwanto makes a similar point through the doctrine of union with Christ. Christian transformation is not autonomous enhancement toward posthuman status but participation in Christ (Suwanto, 2025, pp. 24-30). This yields a stronger critique than the claim that “technology cannot do it.” If Christian criticism rests only on the present inability of technology to upload minds, it may collapse should technical capacities change. A critique grounded in the nature of salvation does not. Even a

technically successful instance of *mind uploading* would still not constitute resurrection, because it would lack a Christological form, would not arise from God's act of raising the dead, and would not establish the continuity of the same person.

A fourth dimension is cosmic. Romans 8:18-25 portrays salvation not as human escape from matter but as the liberation of creation from bondage to decay. Revelation 21:1-5 likewise speaks of a new heaven and a new earth, the descent of the holy city, God's dwelling with humanity, and the abolition of death and mourning. The movement is not from creation into a server, but from God toward the renewal of creation. Kayadoe emphasizes that the vision of the new heaven and new earth carries transformative force for present life because Christian eschatology directs human beings toward renewal, peace, and restoration (Kayadoe, 2023, pp. 86-92). Christian hope is therefore larger than individual survival. It concerns community, embodiment, justice, creation, and communion with God.

Here the contrast with digital immortality becomes especially sharp. Many mind-uploading scenarios assume that the highest achievement is to preserve an individual's mental pattern for as long as possible. Christian eschatology, however, does not identify the human *telos* with endless ego-continuity. Eternal life is not

simply “I keep running.” It is restored life in relation to God, other persons, and creation. Transhumanist soteriology therefore risks becoming a form of eschatological individualism: the subject is saved as an informational package while the physical world becomes dispensable. The gospel moves in the opposite direction. By proclaiming resurrection and new creation, it preserves the theological value of both body and world.

Menacho and Puig-Puig distinguish Christian hope from technological hope in terms of the source, mechanism, and horizon of salvation (Menacho & Puig-Puig, 2025, pp. 690-696). The distinction can be stated more sharply: Christian salvation does not negate technology, but it refuses to make technology the *eschaton*. Technology belongs to human cultural activity within history; it is not the ultimate source of life. It may heal, but it cannot forgive; it may store memory, but it cannot raise a person; it may enlarge capacities, but it cannot create communion with God; it may extend life, but it cannot defeat death in the Pauline sense.

The question posed in this article's title, “Salvation without resurrection?”, must therefore be answered in the negative. Remove resurrection, and what remains may be biological, digital, psychological, or memorial persistence, but it is not Christian salvation as defined by the gospel. Christianity does not offer a technique for avoiding death. It

proclaims the God who enters death in Christ and defeats it through resurrection.

Resurrective-Continuity Criteria and the Critique of Digital Immortality

On the basis of the preceding analysis, this article proposes “resurrective-continuity criteria” as a constructive contribution. The term refers to a set of criteria that distinguish Christian eschatological continuity from forms of persistence produced technologically. The purpose is not to supply a scientific mechanism for resurrection, but to specify the minimal theological structure required for a claim to be consonant with Christian resurrection hope. Four elements are formulated as an integrated whole.

The first element is divine agency. Resurrection is God's act of giving life to the dead, not the successful outcome of humanity's attempt to preserve itself. Divine agency does not imply human passivity toward medicine or technology. Christian theology can affirm healing, care, and efforts to preserve life. The decisive difference appears when technology is granted ultimate status. If immortality is manufactured by human beings, salvation becomes achievement; if salvation is resurrection, final life is received as gift. The first criterion therefore asks: who is the primary agent who guarantees final life? In *mind uploading*, that guarantee is placed in technical systems and data

continuity. In resurrection, it rests in the faithfulness of God.

The second element is embodied personal continuity. Embodiment here does not mean that every biological molecule must be preserved. It means that, theologically, human personhood cannot be reduced to abstract information. Resurrection affirms the body precisely by transforming it. Any form of survival that depends on eliminating embodiment as a constituent of personhood therefore faces a serious problem. Žalec argues that bodily experience, perspectival consciousness, and social relations cannot simply be replaced by a digital substrate (Žalec, 2025). Chia likewise maintains that *mind uploading* does not adequately resolve the difference between a psychological copy and personal survival (Chia, 2023, pp. 1070-1080). The second criterion asks: is the same subject continuing through transformation, or has a new representation appeared that merely shares informational features with the original?

The third element is Christological participation. Christian resurrection has no definition independent of the resurrection of Jesus. Christ is not merely an example showing that resurrection is possible; he is the ground and pattern of eschatological life. The declaration that “Christ has been raised from the dead, the first fruits” in 1 Corinthians 15:20 binds the future of believers to the

Christological event. Salvation is therefore not bare immortality but participation in the life of Christ. This criterion exposes the weakness of technological soteriologies that reduce salvation's goal to increased duration or capacity. A person may live for an extraordinarily long time and remain alienated, unjust, destructive, and enslaved to sin. Length of existence is not the same as eschatological quality of life.

The fourth element is cosmic renewal. Christian hope does not terminate in the preservation of the individual but in new creation. A model of salvation that treats the material world as a temporary container to be abandoned therefore resembles a dualism at odds with the broad trajectory of biblical eschatology. Baggot criticizes transhumanism's secular eschatology for promising a technologically controlled “heaven” while retaining anthropological assumptions that cannot resolve the questions of meaning, morality, and human directedness (Baggot, 2024, pp. 860-872). The fourth criterion asks whether final hope moves toward the restoration of creation and relations, or merely toward the persistence of systems and individuals.

These four elements provide a test for claims of digital immortality. First, *mind uploading* fails the criterion of agency insofar as salvation is defined as an engineered achievement. Second, it remains problematic at the level of personal continuity because it cannot establish

that an informational copy is the same subject. Third, it lacks a Christological structure because its end is not defined by participation in the risen Christ. Fourth, it is cosmically deficient insofar as it shifts hope away from the renewal of creation toward migration from body and world. Thus, even if uploading were eventually to produce a conscious digital entity with genuine moral status, that status would not by itself make the entity the resurrection of the person who was scanned.

These criteria also allow a more precise evaluation of Pardede and Marpaung's proposal. Their description of a post-biological entity as an "I and not-I" is useful because it recognizes that digital continuity need not be treated as nothing. Human traces in digital form may possess memorial, relational, and historical significance and, if an entity were genuinely conscious, perhaps even personal significance. However, the category of "I and not-I" is insufficient for a soteriology of resurrection because resurrection requires an identity stronger than genealogical resemblance. The person raised must truly be the person who died, even though that person's body has been transformed. If what emerges is merely a digital derivative with continuity of pattern, then we are dealing with informational progeny, not resurrection.

At the same time, the resurrectorial-continuity criteria do not require the church to adopt an anti-

digital posture. Limbong has shown that technology may function as a medium of ministry so long as the church does not confuse medium with essence (Limbong 2025, pp. 208-211). The same principle applies to human existence. Technology may preserve memories, extend functions, enable communication, and support therapy. It may even alter embodied experience through prosthetics or digital interfaces. However, a medium must not become the definition of personhood itself. This caution becomes increasingly important as AI develops the capacity to generate highly convincing representations of the dead. Emotional resemblance may lead families to treat a simulation as personal continuation even when its ontological status remains unresolved.

Pastoral and ethical implications follow directly. Churches will need a theological literacy of death and technology so that believers do not confuse a *digital afterlife* with life after death. Future ministries of grief may encounter avatars of the deceased, reconstructed voices, conversational models, and interactive archives. Such technologies may assist memorialization, but they may also postpone the acceptance of death or foster ambiguous relationships with simulations. Resurrection theology establishes a necessary boundary: a loved one has not "come back to life" merely because stored data can speak. Christian hope does not

depend on the completeness of an archive but on the God who knows and raises persons.

These criteria also correct careless ecclesial language about the “immortality of the soul.” When such language is detached from the doctrine of resurrection, the church may inadvertently prepare the conceptual ground for transhumanist logic. If salvation is imagined as disembodied existence, migration into a digital medium can appear to be only the technological version of the same idea. The strongest Christian response to transhumanism, therefore, is not a return to dualism but a more robust theology of embodiment and resurrection. The body is neither idolized nor discarded. It belongs to the creation that God redeems.

The novelty of the resurrective-continuity criteria lies, therefore, in relocating the point of evaluation. The question is no longer “Is this technology natural?”, since many technologies are not natural in any simple sense and may nevertheless be good. Nor is the question “Is this technology too advanced?”, because technological sophistication is not a moral category. The more appropriate question is whether a technological claim about salvation satisfies the structure of Christian resurrection. On this standard, technology may be affirmed at therapeutic and cultural levels while the claim that digital immortality is a soteriological equivalent of resurrection must still be rejected.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Transhumanism poses a theological challenge not primarily because it employs advanced technologies but because it offers an alternative narrative of salvation. In *mind uploading*, human limitation is diagnosed chiefly as a biological and informational problem, while the proposed solution lies in preserving mental patterns beyond the body. The promise is eschatologically attractive because it offers persistence beyond death. However, digital persistence cannot simply be equated with salvation. Data continuity is not personal continuity; simulation is not identical with the subject simulated; and duration of existence is not eternal life.

An adequate Christian critique must therefore center on resurrection. First Corinthians 15, Romans 8, Philippians 3, and the horizon of new creation portray Christian salvation as embodied, Christological, relational, and cosmic. God does not save by abolishing creation but by raising and renewing it. This article has therefore proposed resurrective-continuity criteria comprising divine agency, embodied personal continuity, Christological participation, and cosmic renewal. Together, these elements distinguish resurrection from technological preservation without requiring the rejection of technology's legitimate goods.

The framework also addresses the most recent directions in the debate. Against positions that regard post-biological entities as creative continuations of humanity, it acknowledges their memorial and relational value, and even the possibility that genuinely conscious digital entities might possess moral status, while rejecting the equation of pattern continuity with the identity of the resurrected person. Against critiques of transhumanism that rely only on present technical impossibility, the framework offers a basis that remains stable even if technology changes. Even if *mind uploading* one day became technically possible, it would still not be resurrection so long as final life were produced through informational reproduction rather than through God's act of raising the person in Christ.

The final implications are both theological and pastoral. The church must avoid two opposite errors. The first is a reactive rejection of technology that forfeits its legitimate use in healing, ministry, and human flourishing. The second is an uncritical adoption of the transhumanist imagination in which technology shifts from instrument to object of hope. A more mature Christian response places technology within the horizons of creation and redemption. Technology may extend life, but it cannot give eternal life. It may preserve a person's traces, but it cannot guarantee the continuity of the subject. It may imitate the voice

of the dead, but it cannot raise the dead. Christian hope rests on a different and more radical claim: not that humanity will finally defeat death through machines, but that God has defeated death in the resurrection of Christ and will raise creation into renewed life.

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